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Abstract — Disruption-tolerant networking has gained
currency in the United States due to support
from DARPA, which has funded many DTN projects.
Disruption may occur because of the limits of wireless
radio range, sparsity of mobile nodes, energy
resources, attack, and noise. The delay-tolerant-
network (DTN) model is becoming a viable
communication alternative to the traditional
infrastructural model for modern mobile consumer
electronics equipped with short-range communication
technologies such as Bluetooth, NFC, and Wi-Fi
Direct. Proximity malware is a class of malware that
exploits the opportunistic contacts and distributed
nature of DTNs for propagation. Behavioral
characterization of malware is an effective alternative
to pattern matching in detecting malware, especially
when dealing with polymorphic or obfuscated
malware. In this paper, we first propose a general
behavioral characterization of proximity malware
which based on Naive Bayesian model, which has been
successfully applied in non-DTN settings such as
filtering email spams and detecting bonnets. We
identify two unique challenges for extending Bayesian
malware detection to DTNs (“insufficient evidence vs.
evidence collection risk” and “filtering false evidence
sequentially and distributedly”), and propose a simple
yet effective method, look-ahead, to address the
challenges. Furthermore, we propose two extensions to
look-ahead, dogmatic filtering and adaptive look-
ahead, to address the challenge of “malicious nodes
sharing false evidence”. Real mobile network traces
are used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed
methods.
Keywords — delay-tolerant networks; proximity
malware; behavioral malware characterization;
Bayesian filtering
I. Introduction
Computer network architecture that seeks to address the
technical issues in heterogeneous network that may lack
continuous network connectivity. Examples of such
networks are those operating in mobile or extreme
terrestrial environments, or planned networks in space [1].
The popularity of mobile consumer electronics, like
laptop computers, PDAs, and more recently and
prominently, Smartphone’s, revives the delay-tolerant-
network (DTN) model as an alternative to the traditional
infrastructure model. The widespread adoption of these
devices, coupled with strong economic incentives,
induces a class of malware that specifically targets DTNs.
We call this class of malware proximity malware.
An early example of proximity malware is the Symbian-
based Cabir worm, which propagated as a Symbian
Software Installation Script (.sis) package through the
Bluetooth link between two spatially proximate devices
[1]. A later example is the iOS-based Ikee worm, which
exploited the default SSH password on jailbroken [2]
iPhones to propagate through IP-based Wi-Fi connections
[3]. Previous researches [4] quantify the threat of
proximity malware attack and demonstrate the possibility
of launching such an attack, which is confirmed by recent
reports on hijacking hotel Wi-Fi hotspots for drive-by
malware attacks [5]. With the adoption of new short-
range communication technologies such as NFC [6] and
Wi-Fi Direct [7] that facilitate spontaneous bulk data
transfer between spatially proximate mobile devices, the
threat of proximity malware is becoming more realistic
and relevant than ever. Proximity malware based on the
DTN model brings unique security challenges that are not
present in the infrastructure model. In the infrastructure
model, the cellular carrier centrally monitors networks for
abnormalities; moreover, the resource scarcity of
individual nodes limits the rate of malware propagation.
For example, the installation package in Cabir and the
SSH session in Ikee, which were used for malware
propagation, cannot be detected by the cellular carrier.
However, such central monitoring and resource limits are
absent in the DTN model. Proximity malware exploits the
opportunistic contacts and distributed nature of DTNs for
propagation.
A prerequisite to defending against proximity malware is
to detect it. In this paper, we consider a general behavioral
characterization of proximity malware. Behavioral
characterization, in terms of system call and program flow,
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has been previously proposed as an effective alternative to
pattern matching for malware detection [8],[ 9]. In our
model, malware-infected nodes’ behaviors are observed
by others during their multiple opportunistic encounters:
Individual observations may be imperfect, but abnormal
behaviors of infected nodes are identifiable in the long-
run. For example, a single suspicious Bluetooth
connection or SSH session request during one encounter
does not confirm a Cabir or Ikee infection, but repetitive
suspicious requests spanning multiple encounters is a
strong indication for malware infection. The imperfection
of a single, local observation was previously in the
context of distributed IDS against slowly propagating
worms [10].
Instead of assuming a sophisticated malware con-
tainment capability, such as patching or self-healing [11,
12], we consider a simple “cut-off” strategy: If a node i
suspects another node j of being infected with the
malware, i simply ceases to connect with j in the future to
avoid being infected by j. Our focus is on how individual
nodes shall make such cut-off decisions against
potentially malware-infected nodes, based on direct and
indirect observations. A comparable example from
everyday experience is fire emergency. An early
indication, like dark smoke, prompts two choices. One is
to report fire emergency immediately; the other is to
collect further evidence to make a better informed
decision later. The first choice bears the cost of a false
alarm, while the second choice risks missing the early
window to contain the fire.
In the context of DTNs, we face a similar dilemma when
trying to detect proximity malware: Hypersensitivity leads
to false positives, while hypo-sensitivity leads to false
negatives. In this paper, we present a simple, yet effective
solution, look-ahead, which naturally reflects individual
nodes’ intrinsic risk inclinations against malware
infection, to balance between these two extremes.
Essentially, we extend the Naive Bayesian model, which
has been applied in filtering email spams [13, 14, 15],
detecting botnets [16], and designing IDSs [10, 17], and
address two DTN-specific, malware-related, problems. 1.
Insufficient evidence vs. evidence collection risk. In
DTNs, evidence (such as Bluetooth connection or SSH
session requests) is collected only when nodes come into
contact. But contacting malware-infected nodes carries
the risk of being infected. Thus, nodes must make
decisions (such as whether to cut off other nodes and, if
yes, when) online based on potentially insufficient
evidence. 2. Filtering false evidence sequentially and
distributedly. Sharing evidence among opportunistic
acquaintances helps alleviating the aforementioned
insufficient evidence problem; however, false evidence
shared by malicious nodes (the liars) may negate the
benefits of sharing. In DTNs, nodes must decide whether
to accept received evidence sequentially and distributedly.
II .PROBLEM STATEMENT
Almost all the existing work on routing in delay tolerant
networks has focused on the problem of delivery of
messages inside a single region, characterized by the
same network infrastructure and namespace. However,
many deployment scenarios, especially in developing
regions, will probably involve routing among different
regions composed of several heterogeneous types of
network domains such as satellite networks and ad hoc
networks composed of short- range radio enabled devices,
like mobile phones with Bluetooth interface
III .RELATED WORK
Proximity malware and mitigation schemes. Su et al.
collected
Bluetooth traces and demonstrated that malware could
effectively propagate via Bluetooth with simulations [14].
Yan et al. developed a Bluetooth malware model [15].
Bose and Shin showed that Bluetooth can enhance
malware propagation rate over SMS/MMS [16]. Cheng et
al. analyzed malware propagation through proximity
channels in social networks [17]. Akritidis et al.
quantified the threat of proximity malware in wide-area
wireless networks [4]. Li et al. Discussed optimal
malware signature distribution in heterogeneous,
resource-constrained mobile networks [18]. In traditional,
non-DTN, networks, Kolbitsch et al. [8] and Bayer et al.
[9] proposed to detect malware with learned behavioral
model, in terms of system call and program flow. We
extend the Naive Bayesian model, which has been applied
in filtering email spams [13, 14, 15], detecting botnets
[16], and designing IDSs [10, 17], and address DTN-
specific, malware-related, problems. In the context of
detecting slowly propagating Internet worm, Dash et al.
presented a distributed IDS architecture of local/global
detector that resembles the neighborhoodwatch model,
with the assumption of attested/honest evidence, i.e.,
without liars [10]. Mobile network models and traces. In
mobile networks, one cost-effective way to route packets
is via the short-range channels of intermittently connected
smartphones [9, 10, 11]. While early work in mobile
networks used a variety of simplistic random i.i.d. models,
such as random waypoint, recent findings [12] show that
these models may not be realistic. Moreover, many recent
studies [3], based on real mobile traces, revealed that a
node’s mobility shows certain social network properties.
Two real mobile network traces were used in our study.
Reputation and trust in networking systems. In the
neighbourhood watch model, suspiciousness, defined in
Equation (1), can be seen as nodes’ reputation; to cut a
node off is to decide that the node is not trustworthy. Thus,
our work can be viewed from the perspective of
reputation/trust systems. Three schools of thoughts
emerge from previous studies. The first one uses a central
authority, which by convention is called the trusted third
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party. In the second school, one global trust value is
drawn and published for each node, based on other nodes’
opinions of it; eigenTrust [4] is an example. The last
school of thoughts includes the trust management systems
that allow each node to have its own view of other nodes
[15, 16]. Our work differs from previous trust
management work in addressing two DTNspecific,
malware-related, trust management problems: 1)
insufficient evidence vs. evidence collection risk and 2)
sequential and distributed online evidence filtering.
Consider the case in which i bases the cut-off decision
against j only on i’s own assessments on j. Since only
direct assessments are involved, we call this model
household watch (the naming will become more evident
by the beginning. Let A = (a1, a2, . . . , aA) be the
assessment sequence (ai is either 0 for “non-suspicious”
or 1 for “suspicious”) in chronological order, i.e., a1 is the
oldest assessment, and aA is the newest one Bayes’
theorem tells us: P(Sj |A) ∝ P(A|Sj) × P(Sj). P(Sj)
encodes our prior belief on j’s suspiciousness Sj ; P(A|Sj)
is the likelihood of observing the assessment sequence A
given Sj ; P(Sj |A) is the posterior probability,
representing the plausibility of j having a suspiciousness
of Sj given the observed assessment sequence A. Since
the evidence P(A) does not involve Sj and serves as a
normalization factor in the computation, we omit it and
write the quantitative relationship in the less cluttered
proportional form1. Figure 1 shows the normalized
posterior distributions P(Sj |A) for assessment samples
with different sizes, given by Equation 3. In each case, the
ratio between suspicious and non-suspicious assessments
is the same, i.e., 1:3; by Equation 4, Sj = 1 1+3 = 0.25 is
the maximizer of P(Sj |A), which is clearly shown in
Figure 1. The distribution becomes sharper with a larger
sample, which accords to the intuition of the increasing
certainty on the suspiciousness Sj .
The uncertainty over j’s suspiciousness Sj (and, hence, the
risk of losing a good neighbor) holds i back from cutting j
off immediately, based on insufficient evidence. In the
following discussion, we consider two alternative
approaches, distribution and maximizer, to handle the
insufficient-evidence problem, based on Equations (3)
and (4), respectively. In the distribution approach, i
consider the whole posterior suspiciousness distribution
(Equation (3)) in making the cut-off decision against j.
From i’s perspective, after observing an assessment
sequence A, the probability Pg(A) that j is good is:
We also evaluate the benefits of sharing assessments
among nodes, and the effect of the proposed evidence
consolidation strategies in minimizing the negative impact
of liars on the shared evidence’s quality. We compare the
dogmatic filtering (with dogmatism of 0.0001, 0.01, and 1,
respectively) and adaptive look-ahead evidence
consolidation methods with two other (naive) evidence
consolidation methods: 1) taking no indirect evidence,i.e.,
look-ahead with no evidence consolidation, and 2) taking
all indirect evidence without filtering.
The structure of the behavioral malware characterization
model (specifically, a single threshold Le is used to
distinguish the nature of a node) gives rise to a subtlety
concerning i’s prejudice against j in the distribution
approach. Similarly, i can look multiple steps ahead. In
fact, the number of steps i is willing to look ahead is a
parameter of the decision process rather than a result of it.
This parameter shows i’s willingness to be exposed to a
higher infection risk in exchange for a higher certainty
about the nature of j and a lower risk of cutting off a good
neighbor; in other words, it reflects i’s intrinsic risk
inclination against malware infection.
In the neighborhood-watch model, the malicious nodes
that are able to transmit malware (we will see next that
there may be malicious nodes whose objective is other
than transmitting malware) are assumed to be consistent
over space and time.
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By being consistent over space, we mean that evil nodes’
suspicious actions are observable to all their neighbors,
rather than only a few. If this is not the case, the evidence
provided by neighbors, even if truthful, will contradict
local evidence and, hence, cause confusions:
Nodes shall discard received evidence and fall back to the
household watch model. By being consistent over time,
we mean that evil nodes can not play strategies to fool the
assessment mechanism. This is equivalent to the
functional assumption in characterizing the nature of
nodes by suspiciousness. The case in which the evil nodes
can circumvent the suspiciousness characterization (such
as by first accumulating good assessments, and then
launch an attack through a short burst of concentrated
suspicious actions) calls for game-theoretic analysis and
design, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we
propose a behavioral characterization of proximity
malware; further game- theoretic analysis and design
could base on this foundation. Security concerns for
delay-tolerant networks vary depending on the
environment and application,
though authentication and privacy are often critical. These
security guarantees are difficult to establish in a network
without persistent connectivity because the network
hinders complicated cryptographic protocols, hinders key
exchange, and each device must identify other
intermittently visible devices.[8][9] Solutions have
typically been modified from mobile ad hoc network and
distributed security research, such as the use of distributed
certificate authorities[10] and PKI schemes. Original
solutions from the delay-tolerant research community
include: 1) the use of identity-based encryption, which
allows nodes to receive information encrypted with their
public identifier;[11] and 2) the use of tamper-evident
tables with a gossiping protocol.
IV Conclusion
Security concerns for delay-tolerant networks vary
depending on the environment and application,
though authentication and privacy are often critical In
Behavioral characterization of malware is an effective
alternative to pattern matching in detecting malware,
especially when dealing with polymorphic or obfuscated
malware. Naive Bayesian model has been successfully
applied in non-DTN settings, such as filtering email
spams and detecting botnets. We propose a general
behavioural characterization of DTN-based proximity
malware. We present look-ahead, along with dogmatic fil-
tering and adaptive look-ahead, to address two unique
challenging in extending Bayesian filtering to DTNs:
“insufficient evidence vs. evidence collection risk” and
“filtering false evidence sequentially and distributedly”.
In prospect, extension of the behavioral characterization
of proximity malware to account for strategic malware
detection evasion with game theory is a challenging yet
interesting future work.
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